The Florida legislature passed Senate Bill 718 which aimed to drastically overhaul Florida family laws.  In summary the bill made two major changes.  First, it completely changed the alimony laws in Florida.  It eliminated what is known as “permanent periodic alimony.”  Permanent periodic alimony is rarely ordered under current law, as the Court must find that no other alimony is appropriate prior to ordering permanent periodic alimony.  In the cases where permanent periodic alimony is ordered the marriage is almost always one of “long duration,” or over seventeen years.  There must also be a need by one spouse and the ability to pay by the other spouse. The bill made other changes to alimony in cases of short and moderate duration marriages.  Primarily establishing alimony guidelines, similar to the Florida child support guidelines. This bill would have applied retroactively, meaning, final judgments and even agreements previously reached would be affected.

The other major proposed change was to child time-sharing.  The legislation would have created a presumption for equal time sharing.   Under current law most family attorneys and judges strive for an equal time-sharing plan.  However, there are certain factors the Court must consider before ordering timesharing.  The overriding concern for the family court judge in any child case is the best interest of the child.  The proposed legislation essentially mandated that equal time-sharing was in the best interest of the child absent a showing otherwise.

Below is the letter that Governor Scott wrote explaining his reasons for the veto.

In a dissolution of marriage case, there are generally five major issues, which we identify according to the PEACE acronym. Those are: Parenting, Equitable distribution, Alimony, Child support, and Everything else. What you can expect is that many dissolution of marriage cases get resolved prior to going to trial, either at mediation or by entering into a Marital Settlement Agreement.

If the parties are splitting assets or money, it is important to keep in mind that the way those items are characterized can have consequences on whether they are enforceable by contempt. For example, if one party agrees to give to the other spouse a particular property or a sum of money, whether it is characterized as alimony, child support, or equitable distribution is very important. An obligation of support, such as alimony and child support, is enforceable by the Court through its contempt powers. However, failure to abide by an agreement which calls for a specific equitable distribution scheme is not enforceable by contempt.

But what happens if the agreement between the parties, or the final judgment adopting the same, does not specify whether a particular obligation is in the nature of support or part of equitable distribution? The court in Morrel v Morrel, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D22a (4th DCA 2013), was recently faced with this question. There, the former husband was required to maintain life insurance pursuant to a settlement agreement. When the former husband failed to do as he agreed, the former wife attempted to enforce the agreement through a contempt proceeding. The final judgment did not provide for alimony or other support for the wife. Because of this, but to no avail, the former husband argued that the life insurance was part of equitable distribution of property and therefore not enforceable by contempt. Due to evidence presented, the trial court agreed with the former wife that the life insurance was in the nature of support, and the 4th DCA affirmed. The result was that the husband was ordered “either to secure the insurance or to deposit cash of an equivalent amount in an account for the former wife’s benefit, should he predecease her.”

As you can see from the Morrel case, one way to avoid these situations is to understand the consequences of any provisions in the agreement, which you agree to sign. If you would like to avoid any ambiguity, be as precise and as clear as possible.

For more information, see Morrel v Morrel, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D22a (4th DCA 2013).

Liridona Sinani is an Attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., who practices Family Law and Civil Litigation. She is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida. She primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

Bankruptcy is a legal proceeding which allows a debtor to repay a portion of their debt either by liquidating their non-exempt assets or entering into a court approved repayment plan.  Once the bankruptcy estate is administered or the debtor completes the repayment plan, the debtor is awarded a discharge of their remaining debt.   Most loans and debt are dischargeable in bankruptcy, but there are a few exceptions.

11 U.S.C. § 523 of the Bankruptcy code outlines the various types of debts which are non-dischargeable.  Some of the most common types of non-dischargeable debt includes, but is not limited to, domestic support obligations, debts incurred by fraud, and student loans.  With regards to student loans, the code specifically excepts from discharge debts that are an “obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend” unless excepting this debt from discharge would impose an undue burden on the debtor or the debtor’s dependants.  On the surface this language implies that bankruptcy courts would allow for students loans to be dischargeable if they are a burden on the debtor, however, in reality bankruptcy courts and judges rarely allow for a discharge of student loan debt.

The argument against allowing for student loans to be discharged in bankruptcy is that when a student graduates from college or grad school, they usually have very little assets and little disposable income in relation to their debt.  Although they would have the potential to earn significant income in the future, they could simply file Chapter 7 upon graduation before they begin their professional careers, and the student loan debt would be discharged in a few months with little or no repayment.

Recently, both the U.S. House and Senate have introduced bills to allow for some types of student loan debt to be dischargeable in bankruptcy.  S. 114 and H.R. 532 would allow for the dischargeability of student loans issued by private lenders such as SLM Corp’s Sallie Mae, Wells Fargo Corp. and Discover Financial Services.  The bills would not apply to federal education loans, which comprise about 85 percent of the roughly $1 trillion in outstanding student debt in the U.S.   This is the fifth time that these types of bills have been introduced in the House or Senate.  Both bills have been referred to their respective Judiciary Committees.

Jonathan Bierfeld is an attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses in Bankruptcy Law and Civil Litigation.  He is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida and the Federal Court for the Middle District of Florida.  He primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

The First District Court of Appeal recently addressed what must be proven to receive a modification of child support.  In this case, the Father alleged that he was paying child support in excess of the statutory guidelines and that the reduction in support would be in the best interests of the minor child.  However, the Father DID NOT allege that there was an involuntary and permanent change in circumstances.

Florida Statute § 61.14 addresses what must be proven to modify child support.

the circumstances or the financial ability of either party changes or the child who is a beneficiary of an agreement or court order… reaches majority after the execution of the agreement or the rendition of the order…” Fla. Stat. § 61.14

Failure to allege that the child has reached majority or that there has been a change in circumstances can result in your case being dismissed.  Given that the Court can only modify the child support back to the date of filing, a dismissal could cost you months of paying an increased child support.  Therefore it is very important that matters be properly plead when attempting a modification in child support.

See, VanLooven v. VanLooven, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2385a (Fla. 1d DCA 2012).

If you are seeking a court order to modify time-sharing or custody determination provisions set forth in your mediated settlement agreement, you must prove to the court either that (1) there are facts concerning the welfare of the child that the court did not know at the time that it entered its original order or (2) that there has been a substantial change in circumstances. If you are relying on the second test, you must not only show that the circumstances substantially and materially changed since the original order but also that the requested change in time sharing or custody determination is in the best interests of the child. Your burden of proof is to provide competent substantial evidence in support of your position.

In a recent case decided by the Third District Court of Appeal (3rd DCA), the husband and wife had entered into a mediated agreement whereby the parties agreed to have shared parental responsibility of their minor children and the mother’s residence was designated as the primary residence for the children. About five years after the court entered its final judgment adopting the mediated agreement, the father sought to change the final judgment, particularly the provisions relating to time-sharing and primary residence of the minor children. The father’s arguments for substantial change in circumstances were “parental alienation” by the mother. The crux of the father’s argument was that the older child, as allowed by the mother, had such control over the younger siblings that it detrimentally interfered with the father’s relationship with the younger children.

Relying on the testimony of a clinical psychologist, the trial court held that the father’s allegations of “parental alienation” were “confirmed by [the psychologist].” Due to this, the trial court ordered that the younger children immediately be transferred to the father’s residence and awarded sole parental responsibility of the younger children to the father. The 3rd DCA did not find this ruling to be supported by competent substantial evidence. Upon its own review of the psychologist’s testimony, the 3rd DCA found that that although the older child made every attempt to impair the younger siblings’ relationship with their father, the mother would in fact encourage a relationship between the children and the father. Additionally, the 3rd DCA did not find that the immediate transition of the younger children’s residence from the mother to the father, as ordered by the trial court, was in the best interests of the minor children.

Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that if you are seeking a post-judgment modification of a time-sharing or custody provision in a mediated agreement, you must not only prove a substantial change in circumstances, but also that the requested relief is in the best interest of the child(ren).

For more information, see Sueiro v. Gallardo, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D63 (Fla. 3rd DCA, 2012).

Liridona Sinani is an Attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses primarily in Family Law. She is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida. She primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

Currently Florida’s alimony laws are governed primarily by Florida Statute § 61.08 and the relevant caselaw surrounding alimony.  Florida Statutes were heavily revised in 2009 codifying much of the preceding caselaw.  In Florida there are four types of alimony, bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, durational, or permanent.  The type and duration of alimony is based on the length of the marriage, need of the recipient spouse, and ability to pay of the payor spouse.

Marriages lasting less than seven years are considered short term marriages.  Permanent alimony is rare for marriages of this length.  However, bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, or durational alimony may be appropriate if there exists need and ability to pay.  Marriages of seven to seventeen years are considered moderate duration marriages.  For moderate duration marriages alimony is more likely to be awarded; however, it is still unlikely that the court will award permanent alimony absent clear and convincing evidence of need and ability to pay.  Marriages exceeding a length of seventeen years are the most likely to have permanent alimony awarded when there exists need and ability to pay.

When determining whether alimony is appropriate the Court is guided to look at several statutory factors, including:

(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.

(b) The duration of the marriage.

(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.

(d) The financial resources of each party, including the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.

(e) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.

(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.

(g) The responsibilities each party will have with regard to any minor children they have in common.

(h) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable, nondeductible payment.

(i) All sources of income available to either party, including income available to either party through investments of any asset held by that party.

(j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.”

Fla. Stat. §61.08(2)(a-j).

The Florida House of Representatives is currently considering House Bill 231 which would dramatically change Florida’s alimony laws.  Among the major changes the bill would eliminate permanent alimony.  It would also eliminate much of the discretion our trial judges currently possess in determining need and ability to pay.  The new language would provide stringent guidelines for the percentage of the payor’s income which may be awarded for alimony and for the duration a party may receive the alimony.

For more information about the current alimony laws please visit: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099/0061/Sections/0061.08.html

For more information about the current proposed alimony revisions: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=_h0231__.docx&DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber=0231&Session=2013

Dustin Michael Butler is an Attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses in Family Law and Civil Litigation.  He is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida and the Federal Court for the Middle District of Florida. He primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

One of the key provisions of the “Fiscal Cliff” compromise recently signed into law was the one year extension of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act.  Congress originally passed this legislation in 2007 which generally allows taxpayers to exclude the forgiveness of mortgage debt from being counted as taxable income by the Internal Revenue Service.  Debt on a homeowner’s primary residence that is reduced through a short-sale, foreclosure, or other forms of mortgage restructuring now continue to qualify for this type of relief, at least for another year.

Normally when you borrow money from a commercial lender and the debt is cancelled or forgiven, absent certain exceptions, you may have to include the cancelled amount as income for tax purposes.   The lender is usually required to report the amount of the canceled debt to you and the IRS on a Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt.  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, scheduled to expire at the end of last year, exempts the forgiveness of mortgage debt from being counted as taxable income by the IRS.

The extension of this Act is extremely important to Southwest Florida where many homeowners are underwater, and contemplating a short-sale or loan modification on their home.  Without the extension, a homeowner who owes $175,000 on the mortgage and shorts sells for $125,000 would have been taxed on the $50,000, if the lender forgave the entire deficiency.  This would have placed the struggling homeowner in a considerably higher tax bracket.

Homeowners need to keep in mind that this legislation only applies to debt relief on their primary residence.  Rental property is not included.  There are other common situations, however, in which the cancellation of debt is not considered a taxable event.  Debts discharged through bankruptcy are not considered taxable income.  Further, if you are considered insolvent when the debt is cancelled then some or all of the cancelled debt may not be taxable to you.

Jonathan Bierfeld is an attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses in Bankruptcy Law and Civil Litigation.  He is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida and the Federal Court for the Middle District of Florida.  He primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

With the new year come new Family Law Rules of Procedure. In a recent Florida Supreme Court opinion, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.740(f), which provided for a ten day review period for counsel who was not present when a mediation agreement is reached, was deleted. The rule previously stated that if counsel of record for any party was not present at mediation when an agreement was reached, such counsel has ten days from the service of the copy of the agreement to serve written objections on the mediator, unrepresented parties, and counsel. However, beginning January 1st, 2013, this provision is no longer available.

What exactly does this mean and how does it impact you? Admittedly, mediation can be a costly event. As such, parties under dire financial circumstances may choose to forgo having representation at mediation and instead opt for their attorney to review the agreement and file any objections later. With this new opinion, parties no longer have that 10 day safety net provided by Rule12.740(f). What this means is that in order to ensure that are fully advised of your rights prior to reaching any binding agreements it is best to have counsel present at mediation. However, if your financial circumstances forbid you from doing so, then make sure to incorporate a provision in your mediation agreement allowing for attorney review before you sign the agreement.

For more information, see Supreme Court of Florida Case No. SC11-1454.

Liridona Sinani is an Attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses primarily in Family Law.  She is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida. She primarily practices in Lee County, Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

Generally arrearages which have already vested cannot be modified upon filing a supplemental petition to modify child support.  When one has experienced a substantial change in circumstances which justifies child support to be modified by at least 15% or $50, whichever is more, the Court may modify the child support.  However, modification can only occur upon the filing of a supplemental petition.  Once child support payments become due the support becomes a vested right and generally cannot be modified retroactively.  There are a few exceptions to this rule when compelling circumstances and proper pleadings justify a modification of the arrearages.  Primarily, the exception is limited to cases where a party is incarcerated preventing them from filing the modification and the compelling reason is proper plead in the pleadings.

However, even within this narrow exception, the Court may still deny the modification of vested arrearages.  For example, in a recent case out of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the Court found it improper to modify the child support arrearages even when the subject children had already reached adulthood.  The Court found that the father should have filed a supplemental petition to modify child support upon his incarceration and not after his release.  Further the Court cited numerous cases standing for the principle that child support rights vest at the time the payments are due. 

Thus accrued child support, or child support in arrears, become vested rights of the payee and vested obligations of the payor that are not subject to retroactive modifications.” Puglia v. Puglia, 600 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

It is very important that when a substantial change in circumstances has occurred justifying a modification of child support that the supplemental petition for modification be filed immediately.  Once the payment has become due, it is highly unlikely the Court will modify the arrearage.

See, Cortina v. Lorie, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2037 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).

Dustin Michael Butler is an Attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses in Family Law and Civil Litigation.  He is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida and the Federal Court for the Middle District of Florida. He primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.

What is formerly known as “custody” is currently referred to as “time sharing” in Florida Statutes. When parties in a dissolution of marriage case have a minor child in common, there is a need to establish parental responsibility for the minor child. The parties will strive to agree on a parenting plan, including a a time-sharing schedule, which governs each parent’s relationship with his or her minor child.

For purposes of establishing parental responsibility and creating, developing, or approving a parenting plan, the court must decide all such matters in accordance with the best interests of the child. However, it is important to note that any modification to a determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances in addition to a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.

What may seem as an emergency to you that warrants a modification of an existing time-sharing schedule may not persuade the judge if he or she does not consider it a substantial change in circumstances. For example, in a recent opinion by the First District Court of Appeals, the former husband and wife had time-sharing of their minor child, when the former husband sought to modify it on an emergency basis because his cancer was no longer in remission and his health was deteriorating. The trial court granted the former husband’s motion and modified, on a temporary basis, the final order establishing time-sharing, notwithstanding the fact that the basis supporting the modification was not unanticipated and the court had taken into consideration the former husband’s health when it first issued the final order.

The 1^st DCA overruled the trial court’s decision on this point, holding:

“in order to obtain a temporary modification of custody, the moving party must establish (1) that there has been a substantial change in the condition of one or both parties, and (2) that the change in custody serves the best interests of the child … Furthermore, the substantial change must be one that was not reasonably contemplated at the time of the original judgment.”

Here, because the trial court acknowledged that it had taken the former husband’s health into consideration when it issued the final order, it was without power to grant a modification of such order.

Dissolution of marriage can be an emotional process, especially when children are involved. You want to ensure that you secure the best possible outcome for you and your children. That is why it is important to seek the advice of counsel from the inception of your dissolution of marriage case. If you currently have time-sharing of your minor child or children and are experiencing a change in circumstances that you feel warrants a modification of your existing order, make sure you speak to an attorney so that you are adequately prepared to meet your burden of proof to get a modification granted.

See Langdon v. Langdon, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2012).

Liridona Sinani is an Attorney with Martin Law Firm, P.L., whose practice focuses primarily in Family Law.  She is admitted to practice law in the State of Florida. She primarily practices in Lee County Florida in Cape Coral and Fort Myers, Florida.